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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 12-4568
____________
JOCELYN INFANTE WAMINAL DIGENOVA,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
__________________________________
On a Petition For Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A099-230-676)
Immigration Judge: Steven A. Morley
__________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 13, 2013
Before: SCIRICA, VANASKIE and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed January 10, 2014)
____________
OPINION
____________

PER CURIAM
Jocelyn Digenova (“Digenova”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ final order of removal. For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the petition
for review in part for lack of jurisdiction and deny it in part.

Digenova, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United
States as a non-immigrant visitor on June 23, 2004. On August 31, 2004, she married
Joseph Digenova, a United States citizen. On March 4, 2006, she adjusted her status to
that of a conditional lawful permanent resident on the basis of this marriage. On January
23, 2008, Digenova filed a Form I-751 Petition to Remove the Conditions on Residence,
jointly with her U.S. citizen spouse.1 On May 5, 2009, however, her lawful status was
terminated based on her failure to establish that she entered into her marriage in good
faith. That same day the Department of Homeland Security served her with a Notice to
Appear, charging that she was removable pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(D)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i), based on the termination of her
conditional lawful permanent resident status.
On June 10, 2009, Digenova filed a second Form I-751 Petition to Remove the
Conditions, this time seeking a waiver of the requirement to jointly file the petition, see
INA § 216(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4). She claimed that the termination of her status,
and her removal from the United States to the Philippines, would result in an extreme
hardship to her. See id. In support of her waiver application, Digenova submitted
documentary medical evidence indicating that she suffers from anemia and an iron
deficiency, cervical and lumbar disc degeneration, arthritis, and allergies. She also

1

An alien may obtain “conditional” permanent resident status based on her marriage to a
United States citizen when the marriage was entered into less than two years prior to
obtaining such status. See INA § 216(a)(1), (b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1), (b)(1). The
conditional basis of the permanent resident status can be removed if the alien and the
petitioning spouse jointly file a petition requesting the removal of such conditional basis
and appear for a personal interview. See INA § 216(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1).
2

provided country conditions evidence, including some reports which described health
conditions in the Philippines during the 1980’s and the 1990’s, in support of an argument
that health services for low-income persons in the Philippines are inadequate. Digenova
appeared before a USCIS field officer to provide testimony in support of her Form I-75l
petition. She testified that she has a four-year college degree in business administration
obtained in the Philippines. Before she entered the United States, she worked as an
accounting clerk in the Philippines for approximately 12 years. In the United States,
Digenova worked as a billing clerk for a law firm, earning an annual salary of
approximately $35,000.00.
On March 11, 2010, Digenova’s waiver application was denied by the U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Service (“USCIS”) for failure to show extreme hardship as
required by the statute. After hearing Digenova’s testimony and evidence, the USCIS
field officer concluded that, because of her education and work experience, and her
fluency in English and presumably Tagalog, she would be competitive in the job market
in the Philippines. The field officer noted that, in determining extreme hardship under
the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(e), only those factors arising after
Digenova’s admission as a conditional permanent resident on March 4, 2006 could be
considered. Thus, the time period preceding March 4, 2006 was not relevant for purposes
of establishing Digenova’s extreme hardship claim. The field officer then considered
Digenova’s documentary evidence and found that some of it related to the time period
before she obtained conditional status and was therefore irrelevant. Additionally, her
other evidence did not establish a causal link between the alleged deficiencies in health
3

care services in the Philippines and her individual ability to obtain sufficient care for her
health problems.
Regarding her conditions of anemia and iron deficiency, the field officer found no
evidence that Digenova was currently taking any medication for these conditions or that
she would be unable to obtain proper medical care for these conditions in the Philippines.
Similarly, although her medical reports revealed that she has mild disc disease caused by
arthritis, and that she was taking prescription and over-the-counter medication to manage
her pain, she failed to submit a statement from her physician explaining that this
condition could not be sufficiently managed in the Philippines. Last, the field officer
concluded that Digenova’s allergies did not provide a basis for concluding that she would
suffer extreme hardship if removed because she did not provide any evidence that she
would not be able to manage this common condition in the Philippines.
Digenova next appeared in Immigration Court in removal proceedings and
requested that an immigration judge review the USCIS’s denial of a hardship waiver de
novo, as was her right. See 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f) (“No appeal shall lie from the decision
of the director; however, the alien may seek review of such decision in removal
proceedings.”). On May 10, 2011, the IJ issued his decision, concluding that Digenova
was removable as charged, and denying her request for a hardship waiver under INA §
216(c)(4). The IJ found that Digenova was diagnosed with cervical and lumbar disc
degeneration in 2009. The pain is daily although she does not miss much work. She
takes ibuprofen and a prescription medication, Gabapentin, every day to control her pain.
She was advised to get follow-up care in January, 2010, but did not get that follow-up
4

care until another year had passed. At the pain management facility she attends now, she
has gotten two steroid injections. She also goes to physical therapy one time a week, up
to a maximum of 20 visits a year, as per her health insurance. The IJ noted that one of
Digenova’s medical reports showed mild disc degeneration due to arthritis.
The IJ found that Digenova presented no evidence that she had any significant
allergies that would be detrimental to her in another country. Thus, he focused on the
pain Digenova suffers from her cervical and lumbar disc degeneration, a condition she
suffers from at a relatively young age, in determining whether her removal would cause
her extreme hardship. In considering this evidence, the IJ emphasized that Digenova
waited for approximately ten months between her diagnosis and physician-recommended
follow-up before she actually started going for pain management treatment. Digenova
claimed that she delayed her follow-up because of her concern over her mother’s
hospitalization in the Philippines, but the IJ emphasized that, ultimately, she had health
insurance and still made a choice not to pursue medical care to resolve or alleviate her
pain. Further, the IJ noted that one of Digenova’s pain medications is ibuprofen, which is
available over-the-counter, and presumably can be obtained in the Philippines.
Additionally, the IJ emphasized that Digenova’s primary concern was that she will
get to the Philippines, be unemployed, and be forced into a pay-as-you-go medical
system which she would be unable to afford, but she failed to submit evidence that the
Philippines has a pay-as-you-go health care system, or really any evidence whatever of
the kind of health care system that exists today in the Philippines. Further, Digenova
failed to present evidence that someone with her level of education and amount of work
5

experience would have difficulty finding employment in the Philippines. One university
article she submitted described the Philippines as a lower middle-income country with a
commitment to the evaluation of health care services, and thus her evidence did not show
that the Philippines is a country that ranks at the bottom of the economic scale, such as
Mali or Haiti. The IJ rejected Digenova’s request to take administrative notice of the
economy of the Philippines, concluding that it was Digenova’s burden to show a link
between the alleged deficient health care services in the Philippines and alleged poor job
market on the one hand, and her individual ability to obtain sufficient care for her health
problems on the other.
Digenova appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, contending that she had
ample evidence to show that she would suffer extreme hardship if removed, and was
therefore deserving of a section 216(c)(4) waiver. Digenova contended that the IJ erred
in confining his review to the evidence she had previously presented to the USCIS before
removal proceedings had commenced. With her appeal, Digenova submitted additional
evidence in support of her hardship petition, including evidence of country conditions in
the Philippines related to medical treatment, and further documentation regarding her
medical conditions. Her new evidence included a chart regarding the availability of
treatment in the Philippines for her particular conditions, supported by e-mail
correspondence from hospitals and a specialist in the Philippines, information on cervical
and sacral transformational injection procedures, a summary of Digenova’s insurance
claims and insurance coverage in the U.S. with her current job, information on the salary
scale in the Philippines for the positions of accounting clerk, accounting staff and
6

certified public accountant/auditor, and examples of recent job postings in the
Philippines. Digenova also attached the results of her August 2011 colonoscopy and
EGD, further blood examinations prescribed by her gastroenterologist in September,
2011, the results of her June, 2011 cardio stress echogram, and other recent prescriptions
and tests.
On February 8, 2012, the Board dismissed Digenova’s appeal, agreeing with the IJ
that Digenova’s evidence of extreme hardship was not persuasive. The Board rejected
her contention that the IJ erred by limiting the evidence to documents that were
considered by the USCIS. On the contrary, the Board stated, the IJ’s decision
specifically noted documents that were submitted subsequent to the USCIS termination
notice. To the extent that Digenova submitted new evidence on appeal, the Board
additionally construed her appeal as a motion to remand. The Board noted that a motion
to remand, like a motion to reopen, will only be granted if the new evidence would likely
change the result in the case, citing Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 473 (BIA
1992). The Board then denied Digenova’s motion to remand on these grounds: (1) she
did not explain why the evidence dated prior to her hearing was not available or could not
have been discovered or presented at her hearing; (2) the new evidence of hardship that
pertained to matters occurring outside of the relevant time period (i.e., evidence of
hardship which arose after Digenova’s conditional residence status was terminated) was
not material; and (3) the motion did not include an affidavit from Digenova explaining
how the new evidence supported her claim of extreme hardship.

7

Digenova has timely petitioned for review of the Board’s decision. We generally
have jurisdiction over petitions for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b)(1), but
we lack jurisdiction to review a challenge to the agency’s discretionary denial of an
application for a hardship waiver, see id. at § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Section 216(c)(4) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4), expressly specifies that “the Attorney General, in the
Attorney General’s discretion, may remove the conditional basis of the permanent
resident status for an alien who fails to” file a joint petition if that alien demonstrates that
“extreme hardship would result if such alien is removed.” The statute further provides
that “[t]he determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be given that
evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the Attorney General.” Id. Because this
provision gives the Attorney General sole discretion to grant a hardship waiver, we held
in Urena-Tavarez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 154, 159-60 (3d Cir. 2004), that INA § 216(c)(4)
waiver decisions are exempted from judicial review.
Despite this jurisdictional bar, we retain jurisdiction to review constitutional
claims or questions of law, INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Here, while
Digenova attempts to frame her argument as one of law, she is merely arguing that the
evidence she submitted showed that extreme hardship would result if she was removed.
She claims that the agency erred in failing to consider the record as a whole and by
limiting the evidence it would consider. See Petitioner’s Brief, at 15, 18-22. An
argument that the agency incorrectly weighed evidence or failed to consider evidence is
not a question of law under section 1252(a)(2)(d). See Jarbough v. Att’y Gen. of U.S.,
483 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2007) (recasting challenges to factual or discretionary
8

determinations as due process or constitutional claims is clearly insufficient to establish
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)). Digenova’s argument that the IJ was
required to take administrative notice of the economic conditions in the Philippines, and
argument that the IJ limited the evidence that could be considered in the hardship waiver
proceedings, are nothing more than challenges to the agency’s discretionary
determination and are insufficient to establish jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(D). In any event, it was Digenova’s burden to present evidence. The IJ may
only take notice of commonly known facts such as current events or the contents of
official documents, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv), and the employment outlook in the
Philippines as it relates specifically to Digenova’s qualifications and ability to find work
and thus be able to afford health care, is not a commonly known fact. Similarly, the
record belies any assertion that the IJ limited the evidence that could be considered.
Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition for review, in part for lack of
jurisdiction. We will deny the petition for review to the extent of Digenova’s motion to
remand. We review the denial of a motion to reopen/remand for an abuse of discretion.
See Shardar v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 503 F.3d 308, 315 (3d Cir. 2007). The Board’s
decision will be upheld unless it was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Guo v.
Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Tipu v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 1994)).
A motion to remand for the purpose of submitting additional evidence is treated as
a motion to reopen the proceedings before the IJ. See Huang v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 620
F.3d 372, 389 (3d Cir. 2010); Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 471 (“[W]here a
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motion to remand is really in the nature of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider,
it must comply with the substantive requirements for such motions.”). A motion to
reopen must be based on affidavits or other evidentiary material which were not
“available and could not have been discovered or presented” at the prior hearing before
the IJ. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). In Digenova’s case, the Board properly found that she
did not explain why the evidence dated prior to her hearing on May 10, 2011 was not
available or could not have been discovered or presented at that time. Furthermore, “[a]
motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless” the “evidence sought to be
offered is material.” Id. The Board properly found that the new evidence of hardship
that pertained to matters that occurred after Digenova’s conditional resident status was
terminated was not “material” and thus did not support her motion to remand. See INA §
216(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (“In determining extreme hardship, the Attorney
General shall consider circumstances occurring only during the period the alien was
admitted for permanent residence on a conditional basis.”).
Digenova has argued that the Board erred in rejecting her evidence of “continuing
medical hardship” as immaterial. See Petitioner’s Brief, at 20. She argues that, although
the medical evidence provided was dated after the hearing, it related specifically to
medical conditions arising during the period of conditional residence. Id. at 21. It is true,
as Digenova argues, that the Board has a duty to explicitly consider material evidence
submitted in support of a motion to reopen, Zheng v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 549 F.3d 260,
268 (3d Cir. 2008), but Digenova has pointed to no specific item of material evidence she
believes the Board overlooked, nor has she explained how this new evidence supports her
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claim of extreme hardship. Accordingly, we conclude that the Board did not abuse its
discretion in denying Digenova’s motion to reopen/remand.
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the petition for review in part for lack
of jurisdiction and deny it in part.
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